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CASE NOTES

ousted." Although the claimant's property was characterized as both
unsalable and unrentable after 1963 because of the "value depressing
acts" of the city, there was no "legal interference with his power of disposition." And finally, although the area fell into general disrepair
because of "wide spread publicity, all of which may be termed . . .
continuous agitation, ' 42 there was no "legal interference with the
physical possession or enjoyment of the property."
As concise as this definition may be, the problem in administering
it will no doubt be great. This problem of determining the date of
"taking" in eminent domain proceedings cannot be settled by applying
this or any other presently known definition because the application
always involves questions of fact. To avoid the inherent confusion in
such definitions, the condemning authorities must avoid "de facto
taking." If the date of taking for compensation purposes is established
as the date of the "designation of blight," then any possible "de facto
taking" will be eliminated. 43 Any subsequent "value depressing acts"
will be irrelevant on the issue of compensation. The result will be the
administration of justice, not only to the person forced to sell his land
for the use of the public, but to the public who must pay for it.
Shelby A. Jordan

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEM
WHICH RELIES HEAVILY ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES AND CAUSES
SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITIES AMONG INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN
THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE AVAILABLE PER PUPIL FOR THE DisTRICT'S EDUCATIONAL

GRANTS

INVIDIOUSLY

DISCRIMINATES

AGAINST

THE POOR AND VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.

1971).
A class action was brought by elementary and high school pupils
and parents representing all pupils in the California public school
system and all parents who pay real property taxes and have children
in public schools against certain state officials charged with administrating the school financing system. Plaintiffs asked declaratory and injunctive relief from a system which allows a wealthy school district like
Beverly Hills to spend $1,232 per child for education while Baldwin
Park, a poorer district, can spend only $577 for each of its students. To
raise this $577, Baldwin Park was forced to tax its citizens at a rate of
42 Id. at 899.
48 Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 267 A.2d 64 (NJ. Super. 1970).
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$5.48 per $100 of assessed real property, while the taxing effort of
Beverly Hills, $2.38 per $100, raised $1,232 for each student. Plaintiffs
contended that this system resulted in substantial disparities in quality
and extent of availability of educational opportunities and that the
present form of state aid has failed to alleviate these inequities. The
Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the suit when plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint after demurrers were sustained.
Held-Reversed and cause remanded with directions. A public school
financing system which relies heavily on local property taxes and causes
substantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount
of revenue available per pupil for the district's educational grants
invidiously discriminates against the poor and violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The California public school financing system, which is similar to
systems in most states,' is divided into districts. Each district obtains
funds from two sources: assessed real property tax 2 and state aid. Financial aid from the state consists of a basic grant per student3 and equallization aid distributed inversely to the wealth of the district.4 The
amount raised by the real property tax in any district depends on the
total assessed value of real property within the district and the rate of
taxation, which is decided by the voters of the individual districts. In
theory, the quality of education in each district 5 is determined by the
individual district's willingness to tax itself.6 However, due to vast
differences in the property tax base between districts, a wealthy district
can provide a higher quality education with a lower tax rate than a
poor district can with a much higher rate.7 State grants and a complex
1 Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test
For State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. RaV. 305, 312 n.n.18, 19 (1969).
2 CAL. CONSr., art IX, § 6.
3 CAL. ED. CODE §§ 17751, 17801 (Deering 1969).
4 CAL. ED. CODE §§ 17702, 17901, 17902 (Deering 1969).
5 "Quality of education" will hereinafter refer to the amount of money spent by each
district per A.D.A. or Average Daily Attendance. For the purpose of school aid, determinations are based on A.D.A., a number computed by adding the number of students present
on each school day and dividing by the number of days school was taught. A.D.A. approximates 98 per cent of total enrollment. Serrano uses "per pupil" interchangeably
with "per unit A.D.A." and so shall this case note. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247
n.4 (Cal. 1971).
6 Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd nem. sub nom.,
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S. Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 308 (1969). There the court,
speaking of Illinois school legislation, said, ". . . the General Assembly's delegation of
authority to school districts appears designed to allow individual localities to determine
their own tax burden according to the importance which they place upon public schools."
7Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252 n.15 (Cal. 1971), quoting Legislative Analyst,
Public School Finance, Part V, Expenditures for Education 8 (1970).
County
Los Angeles
Beverly Hill Unified
Baldwin Park Unified

Tax Rate

Expenditure per A.D.A.

$2.38
$5.48

$1,232
$ 577

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol3/iss2/14

2

Blume: A Public School Financing System Which Relies Heavily on Local Pr

1971]

CASE NOTES

system of aid to the poor districts failed to alleviate this disparity and
the great differences in education between districts continued.,
In determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has defined two standards of review. The traditional standard is the reasonable relationship
test: 9
[T]he Fourtenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that,
in practice, their laws result in some inequality.' 0
When the interest of the individual is not a fundamental right but
only a desire to be "treated the same as some particular group of his
fellows,"" the court will look only for a rational relationship between
the legislative classification and its intended purpose. The rational standard was applied in Mclnnis v. Shapiro,12 where the Illinois system of
school financing was held constitutional. The court stated, citing Metro13
politan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell:
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of
equal protection of the14laws if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
McInnis found that "the existing school legislation is neither arbitrary
nor does it constitute an invidious discrimination' 15 and "[w]here differences do exist from district to district, they can be explained rationally."16
These disparities are present throughout the country. See, e.g., Levi, The University, The
Professions, and The Law, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 251, 258 (1968). "[T]he expenditure per high
school pupil in a suburb to the north of Chicago is 1,283 dollars; in a suburb to the
south of the city it is 723 dollars. The expenditure per elementary school pupil in a
northern suburb is 919 dollars, in a southern suburb it is 421 dollars."
8 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Cal. 1971), gives a complete explanation of the
California's system of equalization aid and its failings.
9Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 416 (D. Vt. 1970).
10 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed.2d 393, 399
(1961).
"1 Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 417 (D. Vt. 1970).
12 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I1. 1968), afl'd mem. sub nom., Mclnnis v. Ogilvic, 394 U.S.
322, 89 S. Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 308 (1969).
a 294 US. 580, 55 S. Ct. 538, 79 L. Ed. 1070 (1935).
14 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom.,
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S. Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 308 (1969), citing Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584, 55 S. Ct. 538, 540, 79 L. Ed. 1070,
1072 (1935).
15 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. 111. 1968), afl'd mem. sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S. Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 308 (1969).
16 Id. at 334.
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In some areas of legislative action the rationalstandard has given way
to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The beginnings of this standard
7
can be found in Skinner v. Oklahoma:1
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race .... [T]hat strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
against groups or types of individuals .... 18
If the interest to be protected is fundamental19 or if the classification
is suspect, then the legislative action will be subjected to the strict
scrutiny standard. Classifications made on the basis of race 20 or, more
pertinent to Serrano, wealth, have been strictly examined:
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where
lines are drawn on the basis of wealth . . .[a factor] which would
suspect and thereby
independently render a classification highly
2
demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. '
To overcome the strict scrutiny standard the legislative policy must
be necessary to advance a compelling interest of the state. 22 The court
will look to the result of the classification rather than the intent of the
legislature in deciding the constitutionality of a statute. "[A] law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its opera23
tion."
Serrano concluded that education is a fundamental right thus warranting the use of the strict scrutiny standard of review. The court
found support for this holding in two cases, Brown v. Board of Education 24 and Hargrave v. McKinney.25 In Brown, the Supreme Court
stated, ". . . education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. ' 26 On the opportunity of education, the court
17 316 U.S. 585, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942). Skinner invalidated a statute allowing the state to sterilize a "habitual criminal."
18 Id. at 541, 62 S. Ct. at 1113, 86 L. Ed. at 1660.
19 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed.2d 600 (1969), held that

interstate travel is a fundamental right. Procreation was held fundamental in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed, 1655 (1942).
20 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944).
21 McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 807, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 22 L. Ed.2d
739, 744 (1969).
22 Kramer v. Union Free School District, 595 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed.2d 583
(1969).
23 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2023, 26 L. Ed.2d 586, 593 (1970),
quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590 n.1l, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898
n.1l (1956).
24 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). Brown deals with a racial rather
than a wealth discrimination as in Serrano, both, however, pertain to equal protection in
education.
25 415 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1969).
26 Brown v. Board of Education, 847 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691, 98 L. Ed. 873, 880
(1954).
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held: ". . . where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. '27 In Hargrave,
the federal court of appeals, citing Brown and Hobson v. Hansen, and
referring to education, stated: ". . . we are here dealing with interests
which may well be deemed fundamental .... ,,2sHargrave was an
appeal from a refusal of the lower court to convene a three-judge court
in an action attacking the constitutionality of a Florida statute which
limited the property tax rate a county could impose to support the
public school system. On remand, the district court, using the rational
standard, invalidated the statute:
Having concluded that there is no rational basis for the distinction
which the legislature has drawn, we decline the invitation to explore the fundamental-right-to-an-education thesis, and thus we do
not reach the more exacting "compelling interest" approach.2 9
Finding little direct precedent on the fundamental-right-to-an-education thesis, Serrano turned to criminal cases establishing the rights of
indigent defendants; and the right to vote unhindered by a poll tax.
Both sources are relevant since they deal with rights deemed fundamental protected against the suspect classification of wealth. Griffin v.
Illinois8" held that a state may not grant appellate review in such a way
as to discriminate against some defendants on account of their poverty.
Douglasv. California3x gave the indigent defendant the right to counsel
on appeal. Tate v. Short8 2 held that an indigent defendant cannot be
imprisoned for failure to pay a traffic fine. These cases advance the
principle that, "[A]ll people charged with a crime must, so far as the
law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar of justice .... -33
The poll tax was held unconstitutional in Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections84 because it made the affluence of the voter an electorial standard, a qualification which has no relation to intelligent
voting. The court in Serrano reasoned that a person's education is at
least as important as his vote and:
27 Id. at 493, 74 S. Ct. at 691, 98 L. Ed. at 880.
28 Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969), citing Brown v. Board

of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) and Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuch v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969). Hobson held that the school system of the District of Columbia deprived Negro
and poor children, by segregation, of their right to equal educational opportunity.
29 Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1970). The Supreme Court reversed
on other grounds, Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L. Ed.2d 196 (1971),
but strongly intimated that the question of equal protection should be considered.
30 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956).
31372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed.2d 811 (1963).
32 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed.2d 130 (1971).
33 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956), citing
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S.Ct. 472, 479, 84 L. Ed. 716, 724 (1939).
34 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed.2d 169 (1966).
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[F]rom a larger perspective, education may have a far greater social
significant than a free transcript or a court appointed lawyer.8 5
Defendant state officials raised the defense that geographical uniformity in a state financing system is not required under equal protection. 6
This defense is answered by reference to the Reapportionment cases and
School Closing 7 cases to show:
[W]here fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at stake,
a state's general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis
8
will be significantly curtailed by the equal protection clause. 8
Defendants attempted to show that the present financing system was
necessary to fulfill a compelling state interest. To meet this requirement, "The state must demonstrate the pressing importance of the
classification in the context of some necessary governmental objective. ' '3 9 The state argued that the present financing system was necessary
to achieve two compelling objectives-local administrative control and
local fiscal control to reflect the quality of education desired. Serrano
did not say that these objectives were not compelling, but that the
system not only was unnecessary to achieve these objectives, but, in the
case of fiscal control, it actually frustrated a compelling objective of
the state. As to administrative control the court stated:
35 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).

36Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 552, 74 S. Ct. 280, 284, 98 L. Ed. 281, 288 (1954).
"It is equally clear, although less usual, that a state legislature may itself determine such
an issue for each of its local subdivisions, having in mind the needs and desires of each.
Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requisite." (Emphasis added.) Salsburg is an
application of the rationalstandard of equal protection.
37 The Reapportionment cases laid down the principle of one man-one vote. Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed.2d 506 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed.2d 481 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed.
2d 663 (1962).
The School Closing cases held unconstitutional attempts by certain counties to halt
integration by the closing of public schools. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218,
84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L. Ed.2d 256 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp.
649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd mem., 368 U.S. 515, 82 S. Ct. 529, 7 L. Ed.2d 521 (1962). These
two lines of decisions are thought important in the case for equal educational opportunity
because they show, "(A]ccidents of geography and the arbitrary boundary lines of local
government can afford no basis for discrimination among citizens of a state." Kurland,
Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583, 585 (1968). A closer reading of these decisions will show that the
emphasis was on the importance of the interest to be protected rather than a territorial
classification. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305 (1969). In McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1106, 6 L. Ed.2d 393, 400 (1961), it was said
"[W]e have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as
such, rather than between areas and that territorial uniformity is not a constitutional
prerequisite."
38 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1261 (Cal. 1971). For an explanation of what
"necessary to achieve a compelling state interest" entails in the area of criminal law, see
In re Antazo, 473 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1970), the opinion written by Justice Sullivan, who also
wrote the opinion in Serrano.
39 Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 417 (D. Vt. 1970).
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No matter how the state decides to finance its system of public
education, it can still leave
this decision-making power in the
40
hands of the local districts.
The court calls a "cruel illusion" to poor districts the state's argument
that the system allows the individual district to decide for itself what
quality of education it desires. 4' Using the example of Baldwin Park
and Beverly Hills, 42 the court stated:
[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries
is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its schools,
only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide
how much it really cares about education. The poor district cannot
freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax roles cannot provide. Far from being necessary to provide local fiscal choice,
the present 43financing system actually deprives the less worthy of
that option.
Mclnnis v. Shapiro,44 a federal district case affirmed by the Supreme
Court without oral argument or opinion, validated Illinois' system
of financing and was followed in Burruss v. Wilkinson,45 which upheld
Virginia's system. The argument in Mclnnis was that the fourteenth
amendment requires a school financing system based on the "needs"
of the students. 46 Playing down the vast disparities in expenditures between districts, Mclnnis held, "[C]harges made in the complaint fall
short of demonstrating either an arbitrary exercise of legislative power
or an invidious discrimination," 47 and "[T]here are no 'discernible and
manageable standards' by which a court can determine when the constitution is satisfied .... ",48 Justice Sullivan, writing the opinion in
Serrano, believed that the basis for Mclnnis was the indefiniteness and
nonjusticiability of "educa ional needs" while Serrano pleads a recognizable criterion-discrimi iation by wealth of a fundamental right.
On the Supreme Court's ,ummary affirmance of Mclnnis, the court
stated:
[A] Supreme Court affirn ance can hardly be considered dispositive
40 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 124., 1260 (Cal. 1971).
411d. at 1260.
42 Id. at 1252 n.15.
43 Id. at 1260.
44 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 19 i8), aff'd mem. sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322, 89 S. Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 30E (1969).
45 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.), iff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44, 90 S. Ct. 812, 25 L. Ed.2d 37
(1970). In Mclnnis, Justice Dougla believed the case should be set for oral argument. In
Burruss, Justice White joined Just :e Douglas in this opinion.
46 Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Su',p. 327, 331 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S Ct. 1197, 22 L. Ed.2d 37 (1970).
47 Id. at 334.
48 Id. at 335, citing Reynolds v. 1 ms, 377 U.S. 533, 557, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1376, 12 L. Ed.2d
506, 524 (1964).
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of the significant and complex constitutional questions presented
here.4 9
Serrano v. Priest raised education to the inner circle of strictly examined rights and left California without a constitutional school financing system. Similar suits are pending in other states.50 If the
movement in this constitutional struggle follows Serrano, the financial
structure of public education throughout the nation will have to be
revised. 51 Public education has been legislated, districted, and taxed so
that in many areas the kind of education a child receives depends on
the income of his parents. An inferior education will insure a 52life of
poverty for a child and an inferior education for his posterity.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, when the state has undertaken to
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
provide
53
terms.
Lawrence J. Blume
49Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971). It is suggested that the Supreme
Court is waiting until the issues are more clearly defined. "It is probably more significant
as an admonition to the protagonists to clarify the options before again invoking the
Court's aid." Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1969).
50 Coons, Cune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test
For State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 307 (1969).
51 One alternative is centralized financing by the state to districts on an equal per pupil
basis. The district would be required to use the money in a reasonable manner, or more
strictly, equally on each student. Another possibility is direct aid to the pupil. This, however, would imply freedom to spend the money in private schools. A more obvious solution
would be retention of local financing, but state equalization aid which would insure equal
allocation per A.DA., district tax rates being equal. The advantage of this program is the
retention of local fiscal control. The standard, which would allow a wide variety of programs, would be-"the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other
than the wealth of the State as a whole." Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L REV.
305, 311 (1969).
52Speaking of the inequalities in the Washington, D.C., school system as a result of
segregation, Judge Skelly Wright said, "[a]ny system of ability grouping which, through
failure to include and implement the concept of compensatory education for the disadvantaged child or otherwise, fails in fact to bring the great majority of children into the
mainstream of public education denies the children excluded equal educational opportunity and thus encounters the constitutional bar." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
515 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuch v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
53 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691, 98 L. Ed. 873, 880
(1954).
ADDENDUM: A United States District Court in the Eighth Circuit (Minn.) relied extensively on Serrano in holding that the school financing system was a violation of the
equal protection clause. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2228 (Oct. 12, 1971).
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